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Why Is There So Much Poverty in California?

T

he purpose of this report is to describe the current state
of poverty in California, to discuss concrete steps that
could be taken to reduce poverty in California, and to
present the best available evidence on the likely effects of
those steps. We take on an important but infrequently-posed
question: If California were to seriously commit to reducing
poverty, how might that commitment best be realized?
This is of course a hypothetical question, as there is no evidence that
California is poised to make such a serious commitment, nor have many
other states gone much beyond the usual lip service proclamations. It is
nonetheless especially striking that California, the highest-poverty state in
the country, has not rushed in to rectify the matter.1
There are many reasons for this seeming complacency, but an especially
important one is that most people think that poverty is intractable and
that viable solutions to it simply don’t exist. When Californians know what
needs to be done, they tend to go forward and get it done. When, for example, the state’s roads are in disrepair, there are rarely paralyzing debates
about exactly how to go about fixing them; and instead we proceed with
the needed repairs as soon as the funds to do so are appropriated. The
same type of sure and certain prescription might appear to be unavailable
when it comes to fixing poverty. It is hard not to be overwhelmed by the
cacaphony of voices yielding a thick stream of narrow-gauge interventions, new evaluations, and piecemeal proposals.2
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Although the research literature on poverty is indeed
large, recent advances have been so fundamental that
it is now possible to develop a science-based response
to poverty. If in the past we just didn’t know what to do
about poverty, that is simply no longer the case. The
causes of poverty are well established, and the effects
of many possible policy responses to poverty are likewise well established.
This is not to gainsay the difficulty of the task before us.
To date, no attempt has been made to sort exhaustively
through the full complement of evidence on poverty
reform and interventions that might work in California,
no doubt mainly because that evidence is so far flung.
The relevant literature can be found variously in subfields pertaining to prenatal and postnatal interventions,
child development and child care, early childhood education, community schools, place-based interventions,
after-school interventions, low-income tax credits,
minimum wage reform, vocational training, workforce
development, and of course much more. Because the
field is so differentiated, an expert may be able to master the literature in one or two of the relevant subfields,
but not typically the field in its entirety.
We have accordingly proceeded by first reviewing each
of these subfields separately and then culling from
these reviews the results that were most important and
relevant in building a poverty-reduction plan. It is only
the latter results that appear in this (relatively) abbreviated report. For our purposes here, the objective is not
to provide a comprehensive summary of those background reviews, but rather to engage very selectively
with the evidence that is most relevant for the types of
poverty found in California and the types of programs
and policies that might be implemented in California.
The full set of reviews that stand behind this report will
be posted on the website for the Stanford Center on
Poverty and Inequality (www.inequality.com).
We have no interest in issuing an academic report
about policies that will never be undertaken. We have
much interest, by contrast, in laying out policies and
programs that could plausibly garner support and that
would reduce poverty substantially insofar as that support is garnered. In assembling this report, we have
accordingly taken very seriously the key values and
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commitments that are widely shared within the United
States, values and commitments that affect the types
of programs that we are likely to embrace and call our
own. There is little point, for example, in attempting to
incorporate programs or policies that rest on a wholly
foreign set of values, even if those programs or policies
are proven poverty-reducers. It is not simply that such
programs would likely be opposed by many Californians and therefore never come to fruition. Even if they
were somehow implemented, the resulting programs
would never feel like our own, would not mesh well with
our existing institutions, and would likely be mired in
controversy from the start.
We have also sought to work within the constraints
of California’s institutions, programs, and policies. As
a result, our proposal mainly entails building on California’s existing safety net, in effect ramping up those
programs for which the evidence is strong. We have also
sought to build on and exploit various reforms under
way in California (e.g., health care reform, Local Control Funding Formula). The goal, in short, is to build a
comprehensive reform package that rests on programs
backed by the best science, that integrates seamlessly
with the existing safety net, and that builds on initiatives
already in play.
This essay presents in summary form the package of
reforms that emerged out of this review and that, taken
together, offer an unprecedented opportunity to reduce
poverty in California. The package is motivated by a
commitment to equalize access to investments in skill
and to ensure that those who work hard will not be in
poverty.
Although the heart of our report is a presentation of the
evidence behind these reforms, we first discuss the main
features of poverty in California, the main ways in which
California’s safety net responds to poverty, and the role
of science in informing poverty policy. We then turn to a
lengthier discussion of (a) the key evidence on behalf of
our equal opportunity approach, (b) the various ways in
which this approach might be implemented, and (c) the
rationale for holding off—for now—on a major program
to increase take-up of existing programs. We conclude
by discussing the extent to which these reforms would
address the distinctive features of poverty in California.

Why Is There So Much Poverty in California?

does california have a distinctive brand of poverty?

T

made is that we have much of it, indeed there is good
reason to believe that California has the highest poverty
rate in the U.S.5 As shown in Figure 1, 22.0 percent of all
Californians were living in poverty in 2011, a percentage
that’s substantially higher than the corresponding OPM
percentage for that year (i.e., 16.2).6 The relationship
between the CPM and OPM is complicated because
some features of the CPM work to reduce poverty
relative to the OPM (e.g., incorporating non-cash and
post-tax transfers) while other features work to increase
it (e.g., allowing for high housing costs). The results in
Figure 1 nonetheless make it clear that in the end these
countervailing forces yield a poverty rate for California
that’s far higher than the official one.

he groundwork for this review is usefully laid by
discussing what is—and is not—distinctive about
poverty in California. In delivering this descriptive
overview, we rely principally on the California Poverty
Measure (CPM), a measure that hews to the spirit of the
Census Bureau’s Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM)
but also improves on it by using administrative data and
by taking into account unique features of California.3
The CPM, like all SPMs, provides an authentic portrait of the experience of poverty because it takes local
housing costs into account, adjusts for non-discretionary expenses (e.g., medical out-of-pocket costs, child
care costs), and includes the poverty-reducing effects
of non-cash and post-tax transfers (e.g., CalFresh, the
Earned Income Tax Credit). Although we will also report
on the Official Poverty Measure (OPM) for purposes
of comparison and completeness, the CPM statistics
arguably provide the best representation of the experience of deprivation and disadvantage in California.4 We
summarize here the key features of California poverty in
the form of six conclusions.

Persistence of deep poverty: It might be thought that
California’s high poverty rate is misleading because
many families are just barely under the poverty threshold and hence just barely in poverty. This is not the case.
In fact, 6.1 percent of California’s population is in “deep
poverty,” where this refers to families with incomes
that are 50 percent or less of the poverty threshold.7
Although some of the counties with high rates of deep
poverty are agricultural or rural (e.g., 6.8% in Merced

A high-poverty state: In any discussion of poverty
in California, perhaps the most important point to be

figure 1:

California Poverty Measure for Full Population and by Age Group
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Source: Christopher Wimer, Marybeth Mattingly, Matt Levin, Caroline Danielson, and Sarah Bohn. 2013. “The California Poverty Measure: A Portrait of Poverty Within California Counties and Demographic Groups,” The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality (in collaboration with the Public Policy Institute of California), http://www.inequality.com/poverty/cpm.
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figure 2:

County), others are urban or suburban (e.g.,
7.6% in San Diego County).

California Poverty Measure by County

A persisting adult poverty problem: In conventional OPM-based analyses, it is frequently
reported that children have much higher poverty rates than adults, a result that reflects,
in part, the distribution of cash benefits (e.g.,
Social Security) that the OPM takes into
account. Even under the CPM, the poverty
rate for children is higher than that for adults,
but the gap between the two rates is smaller.
The gap closes because of disparities across
age groups in the likelihood of receiving noncash and post-tax transfers (which the OPM
does not pick up). The poverty rate for children, 25.1 percent, is of course especially
high, but Figure 1 also shows that a full 21.4
percent of working-age adults and 18.9 percent of the elderly are in poverty in California.
Housing-induced poverty: The conventional
wisdom has long had it that poverty in California is disproportionately a Central Valley affair.
As Figure 2 reveals, there are indeed high poverty rates in many Central Valley counties (e.g.,
23.6% in Yolo County), but more surprisingly
there is also much poverty in urban California.

Source: Christopher Wimer, Marybeth Mattingly, Matt Levin, Caroline Danielson, and Sarah Bohn.
2013. “The California Poverty Measure: A Portrait of Poverty Within California Counties and Demographic Groups,” The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality (in collaboration with the Public
Policy Institute of California), http://www.inequality.com/poverty/cpm.

figure 3:

California Poverty Measure by Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration Status
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Source: Christopher Wimer, Marybeth Mattingly, Matt Levin, Caroline Danielson, and Sarah Bohn. 2013. “The California Poverty Measure: A Portrait of Poverty Within California Counties
and Demographic Groups,” The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality (in collaboration with the Public Policy Institute of California), http://www.inequality.com/poverty/cpm.
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The poverty statistics for Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and San Diego counties are 26.9, 23.4 and 22.7 percent respectively.8 What accounts for such high rates
of poverty? The key source is simple and obvious: In
large urban counties, housing and other living costs are
typically very high, often making it difficult for families to
get by. Although urban families may have better access
to better-paying jobs, Figure 2 reveals that this labor
market advantage is more than offset by the housing
market disadvantage.
The immigrant effect: This is not to suggest that high
housing costs are the only source of California’s unusually high poverty rates. The relatively large immigrant
population in California is also relevant because, as
shown in Figure 3, poverty rates among immigrants
are exceedingly high, indeed 36 percent higher than
poverty rates among natives (i.e., [29.9 – 19.1]/29.9 =
.36). The native-immigrant disparity is especially pronounced under the CPM because, unlike the OPM, it
registers safety net benefits that are often available for
natives but not for immigrants. It bears noting that the
CPM poverty rates for Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians
are also relatively high. At the same time, the poverty
rate for non-Hispanic Blacks is lower under the CPM
than the OPM, partly because the OPM does not take
into account precisely those non-cash and post-tax
transfers that especially benefit non-Hispanic Blacks.

to produce the requisite college graduation rates, and
(b) attend the types of colleges that provide substantial
economic returns to their graduates (thereby ensuring
that graduates indeed experience the low poverty rates
of Figure 3). Moreover, any credible evaluation of such
a policy would have to take into account its effects on
the pay and employment prospects of those who do
not attend college, effects that might be generated, for
example, by any corollary reductions in the size of the
low-skill labor force. That is, insofar as the number of
college graduates is ramped up substantially, the associated “siphoning off” of low-skill workers will reduce
unemployment rates and raise wages among workers
who remain in the low-skill sector and now experience
less competition. It follows that a pro-college policy
may indirectly reduce poverty even among those who
are not direct beneficiaries of that policy.
The foregoing is merely an illustration of the (perhaps
obvious) difficulties in formulating policy rather than any
attempt at an authentic policy analysis. At this point, we
are only pointing out that, however simple the descriptive facts of poverty may seem, it is important to resist
the temptation to move too quickly from facts to policy
prescription.

figure 4:

The facts presented in this section do not easily translate
to prescriptions about the most effective anti-poverty
programs in California. It might be imagined, for example, that the sizable educational disparities of Figure 4
direct us to a policy of increasing the number of college
graduates. Although such a policy may be attractive in
principle, its success would depend on ensuring that
the new college entrants (a) have adequate preparation

California Poverty Measure by Education
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60

CPM

53.9%

50
44.7%

40
percent

Large educational disparities: The latter disparities by
race, ethnicity, and immigration status are large, but
they are swamped by the even more dramatic disparities between educational groups. As revealed in
Figure 4, the chances of being poor are one in two for
high-school dropouts (53.9%) and one in three for highschool graduates (33.2%), but less than one in ten for
college graduates (9.8%). These large educational disparities are of course hardly distinctive to California. If
high rates of immigration and high housing costs are
special features of the California poverty landscape, the
substantial educational disparities most surely are not.
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Source: Christopher Wimer, Marybeth Mattingly, Matt Levin, Caroline Danielson, and
Sarah Bohn. 2013. “The California Poverty Measure: A Portrait of Poverty Within California Counties and Demographic Groups,” The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality
(in collaboration with the Public Policy Institute of California), http://www.inequality.com/
poverty/cpm.
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the safety net in california

B

the more conventional and narrow definition of poverty
policy, a definition that focuses wholly on the effects of
the safety net itself.

efore laying out any new proposals, it is also
important to examine the effectiveness of California’s current and ongoing policy, where
“policy” is narrowly construed here as the effects of
the safety net. It should be appreciated from the outset
just how narrow this definition is. After all, the state’s
poverty population is also directly affected by a host
of institutional practices that are quite unrelated to the
safety net itself, such as the provision of prenatal care,
the size of the prison system, or the number of funded
college slots. Although these institutional decisions
are not always understood as a form of poverty policy,
they are in fact powerful determinants of the size of the
poverty population and hence should be understood as
such. If, for example, a decision were made to radically
increase the number of funded college slots, the result
might well be an accordingly dramatic reduction in the
size of the state’s poverty population (subject to the
caveats laid out above). We will indeed be presenting
some key legal and institutional reforms that, if undertaken, would yield substantial reductions in poverty. For
the purposes of this section, we nonetheless focus on

figure 5:

Large effects of the safety net: The first conclusion
about such mechanical effects is that they are quite
large (see Figure 5). If all safety net benefits were suddenly eliminated (i.e., CalFresh, CalWORKs, tax credits,
school meals, housing subsidies, SSI, Social Security),

The Poverty-Reducing Effect of the Safety Net by Age Group
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cash-based ones. In the following analysis of safety net
effects, it should also be borne in mind that we are only
reporting on the wholly “mechanical” effects of benefits
(in pushing family income above the poverty threshold),
not the possible second-order behavioral effects that
any change in benefits might in the longer run bring
about.
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the percentage of California’s population in poverty
would increase by 12.9 points (i.e., from 22.0% to
34.9%). Whereas the poverty-reducing effect of the
safety net is especially large for children (15.0 points)
and the elderly (29.1 points), it is comparatively small
for working-age adults (9.0 points). These results make
it clear that, despite the many criticisms leveled against
the state’s safety net, it is doing real and substantial
poverty-reducing work in its current form. To be sure,
the state’s poverty population remains the largest in the
country even after our state’s safety net is applied, but
that should not obscure the equally important point that,
absent the safety net, the poverty population would be
far larger (and would in fact rise to well over one-third of
California’s population).

credits, and CalWORKs accounts for 80 percent of the
safety net’s effect on child poverty (i.e., 12.0/15.0 = .80),
but only for 54 percent of its effect on working-age poverty and 4 percent of its effect on elderly poverty (i.e.,
4.9/9.0 = .54; 1.2/29.1 = .04). These differential effects
should of course be taken into account when evaluating
possible expansions of particular programs.

Two safety nets: If the first conclusion is that the safety
net has big effects, the second is that those effects
work through rather different programs for children and
adults. In effect, California has two safety nets, one for
children and another for adults. The children’s safety
net rests on the three-way punch of CalFresh, tax credits, and CalWORKs, whereas the adult safety net relies
rather more on the two-way punch of Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) and Social Security benefits.
As Figure 5 shows, the combination of CalFresh, tax

The dominance of EITC: We can cast further light on
the “children’s safety net” by considering each of its
constituent programs separately and recalculating
the poverty rate under the hypothetical that the benefits from that program are unavailable. This exercise
reveals (see Figure 6) that poverty rates increase the
most when tax credits are excised. If tax credits were
completely eliminated, the poverty rate would increase
to 31.1 for “all children” and to 32.6 for children under
age 6. This result reflects the effect of (a) the overall
size of the program (the number of beneficiaries and the
average size of their benefits), (b) the extent to which
the program targets the poor (as opposed to families
whose incomes exceed the poverty threshold), and (c)
the extent to which benefits to the poor are delivered to
families that are close enough to the poverty threshold
that the benefits will push them over it. The “tax credit”
effect is so large in part because the Earned Income

figure 6: The Poverty-Reducing Effect of the Safety Net
Among Children

figure 7: The Key Role of “Extra Expenses” in
Generating Poverty Among Children
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the stanford center on povert y and inequalit y

7

Why Is There So Much Poverty in California?

Tax Credit (EITC) is such a large program. At the same
time, the EITC often goes to families that are not in
CPM poverty, with the offsetting result that the EITC’s
poverty-reducing effects are not as large as one might
imagine given the size of the EITC budget. This latter
feature of the EITC is obviously crucial in assessing a
state supplement to the EITC. Although there are important work-incentivizing benefits to delivering ongoing
assistance to families already out of poverty, there is
an obvious tradeoff between ensuring adequate incentives and ensuring adequate benefits to families that are
beneath the poverty line.

we reduce poverty substantially by adopting programs
that reduced or eliminated these “extra expenses?” The
simple answer: Yes. In fact, if we could find a way to fully
eliminate such expenses, 25.5 percent of all children in
poverty would be lifted out (i.e., [25.1 – 18.7]/25.1 =
.255) and 24.7 percent of children under age 6 would
be lifted out (i.e., [26.3-19.8]/26.3 = .247). These results
imply that roughly a quarter of California’s child poverty is generated by medical, child care, and other work
expenses. It is of course too early to tell whether the
Affordable Care Act will have an appreciable effect on
the poverty-inducing effects of such extra expenses.

The importance of extra expenses: The next figure
reveals the role of “extra expenses” in driving up the
poverty rate (see Figure 7). By “extra expenses,” we
mean both (1) out-of-pocket medical expenses, and (2)
expenses incurred principally as a cost of going to work
(i.e., child care, transportation costs for work). Could

We again do not mean to imply that the preceding
results lead to any direct policy prescriptions. Rather,
we provide them here only as “facts on the ground,”
facts that serve mainly to illuminate how our safety net
is working and the problems that remain and that new
anti-poverty initiatives might address.

8
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evidence and values in poverty policy

W

e turn now to a discussion of the types of antipoverty policies that California might consider
and the likely effectiveness of those policies.
In reviewing the available evidence, we do not mean
to suggest that any policy decision can be “evidencebased,” indeed even the more relaxed and fashionable
standard of “evidence-informed” policy proves to be a
high bar. There is much research showing, for example,
that policy tends to be formed on the basis of a host
of non-scientific factors, including judgments about the
political feasibility of particular programs, the interests
of particular advocates or lobbyists, an especially compelling image or narrative about the sources of poverty
or the effectiveness of particular programs, or a tendency to favor the most fashionable “flavor-of-the-day”
program or intervention.9
It is not simply that these political forces and psychological biases inevitably intrude into the policymaking
process. Even if these biases could be cleared away
and a straightforwardly science-based decision became
possible, the unfortunate fact of the matter is that the
science has not yet developed to the point that it can
always provide an entirely clear and definitive judgment
on the optimizing policy. The available science falls
short of that (very high) standard in at least two important ways.
Difficulty of making comparative assessments: The first
and most obvious point is that the available science,
for all its successes, does not always or even usually
provide clear guidance on the matter of which policy
is optimizing as against the full range of choices. The
available research typically speaks to the more narrow
question of whether any given program or policy has a
demonstrable effect. In principle, the availability of such
research allows us to eliminate from consideration any
policy for which effects cannot be demonstrated, but it
cannot assist in the more demanding task of choosing
an optimizing policy from among the host of possibilities
that have not been so eliminated. It is a mixed blessing
in this regard that, although there are many negative
assessments of program effectiveness, we are left with
even more programs and policies for which the requisite
research has not yet been carried out, is inconclusive,
or suggests positive effects. The resulting embarrass-

ment of riches, however attractive in the abstract, leads
to difficulties in making bona fide science-based decisions. Although there have been some efforts to carry
out comparative cost-benefit assessments of multiple
policies, these are still quite limited in the range of
programs covered and the exhaustiveness with which
costs and benefits are identified.10
Design problems: Even when one drops back to the
more limited objective of evaluating a single program
or policy, the available evidence is often based on
research designs that fall short of the ideal and yield
accordingly inconclusive evidence. The gold standard
is conventionally understood to be a randomized controlled trial (RCT) that allows us to formally assess the
likelihood that any observed differences in outcomes
are attributable to preexisting differences between the
subjects. In the absence of RCTs, there are still many
high-quality research designs that can yield convincing
assessments of causal effects (e.g., regression discontinuity), indeed the development and application of
such alternatives has been one of the more important
recent achievements of the field. We will be reviewing
many studies deploying either RCTs or one of these
alternative approaches. If our capacity for causal inference is accordingly better than ever, it is obviously not
good enough to reach definitive conclusions on all the
programs and policies of interest. There are unfortunately many areas in which none of the available
research designs is strong enough to reach unambiguous assessments.
This is all to suggest that, because the available evidence is far from definitive, our task cannot reduce to
that of simply determining which interventions work
best and then bundling those interventions into a larger
anti-poverty program. Even if the available evidence
were definitive, a haphazard assemblage of “what
works” would likely make for a poor safety net, as such
an assemblage wouldn’t amalgamate into anything
coherent or take into account our larger commitments
about how our institutions are best organized. If a program does not resonate with these commitments, our
support for it will be partial and mired in controversy
from the start.
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It is far better, then, to focus on programs that not only
“work” in a narrow sense but that are also consistent
with the country’s most fundamental beliefs about how
our safety net institutions should be structured. This line
of reasoning suggests a set of reforms that express our
shared commitment to the principles of equal opportunity and the value of work. Although the U.S. is a
heterogeneous country with many competing views,
there is much evidence that these two commitments are
quite widely accepted.11 We review each in turn below.
Equal opportunity: In the U.S., we are committed to
ensuring that all children, no matter how poor, have an
opportunity to develop their talents and capacities. This
commitment is difficult to realize given that opportunity
is often “on the market” and available for purchase:
That is, well-off parents can afford high-quality healthcare, child care, and schooling in ways that then
advantage their children, whereas poor parents cannot
afford to “purchase opportunity” for their children to the
same extent. However difficult to achieve, an earnest
commitment to the principle of equal opportunity has
nonetheless long figured in American discourse, indeed
this commitment is even laid out in drafts of the country’s founding documents.12 If our safety net is built
around the principle of equalizing access to opportunities, it becomes an institution that is consonant with
fundamental American values. It becomes our institution expressing our values. The equal opportunity
approach, which we lay out below, accordingly focuses
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on a package of interventions that allow children from
poor families to have fair and equal access to opportunities to develop their capacities, skills, and credentials.
Making work pay: If the commitment to equal opportunity is deeply cherished in the U.S., so too is the
principle that everyone should work (insofar as they are
able to do so) and that hard work should pay off. In
1996, the U.S. welfare system was revamped to encourage employment and reduce welfare dependency, a
reform that was followed by a substantial decline in the
size of the nonworking poor population.13 If a new round
of safety net reform is consonant with this commitment
to work and making work pay, it will again express our
deepest values and garner widespread support. We will
discuss below a variety of reforms, including tax credits,
that are consistent with this commitment.
The programs discussed below are not, then, simply
an assemblage of what works.14 In building a better
safety net, it is equally critical to bring it into close alignment with our most cherished commitments, thereby
ensuring that it becomes an institution to which most
can wholeheartedly commit. There are of course many
interventions on offer that satisfy this constraint. The
purpose of the following review is to transparently report
on the evidence for these interventions, noting when it
lends itself to strong conclusions, when it falls short of
that standard, and when opinions differ on the matter of
how strong the evidence is.15
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THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PLAN

W

e begin, then, by laying out a plan that will
increase opportunities for poor children to
develop their skills and talents. This approach
is founded on the growing consensus that cost-effective
policy (1) identifies the key junctures in the lifecourse
that determine the development of skills and capacities,
and (2) intervenes at those junctures in ways that offset the disadvantages facing low-income children and
adults.
It is of course difficult to equalize opportunities fully and
completely because children born into middle-class
families will inevitably have access to better healthcare, better child care, better schools, and all manner
of other advantages that will ultimately assist them in
the labor market. The cumulative effect of such advantages can nonetheless be reduced with compensatory
programs targeted to key junctures when capacities are
being formed or decisions are being made. Although
this approach naturally leads one to early interventions,
there are also critical junctures in the later lifecourse
that are cost-effective to target, as discussed at the end
of this section of the report.16
The following discussion will be organized temporally by
laying out cost-effective interventions at each successive stage of the lifecourse. We start with home-visiting
programs that begin prenatally; we then turn to early
education for preschool and older children; we follow
with a targeted set of interventions for school-age children and young adults; we next consider job training
reforms principally oriented toward adults; and we conclude by discussing a set of legal and tax reforms that
reduce discrimination and (partly) compensate for barriers to opportunity confronted early in life.

The Very Early Lifecourse
The purpose of home-visiting programs is to improve
child and adult health practices, improve parenting
practices, and provide referrals to available social services. These programs are built around home visits by
nurses or trained staff who provide at-risk mothers with
guidance on (a) diet and other prenatal practices, (b) the
child’s health and development, and (c) parenting. The

main rationale for such programs is that they identify atrisk children early on, intervene before problems cascade
into much larger ones, and thereby lead to improved
health, parenting, and cognitive development in ways
that have substantial long-term benefits. Although most
home-visiting programs focus on improving health, they
also provide an opportunity to complete more general
case work, such as referral to available social services.
These programs are based on the growing evidence that
prenatal and early childhood experiences affect neural
functions and structures that in turn shape future cognitive, social, emotional, and health outcomes.17 Even
at 18 months old, children from poorer households are
much slower at identifying pictures of simple words,
such as “dog” or “ball.”18 By kindergarten, there is a substantial gap between poor and middle-class children in
reading skills, such as recognizing letters and beginning
word sounds. There are likewise substantial differences
in math skills (e.g., counting, recognizing basic shapes)
and in behavioral regulation.19 Because the effects of
poverty register so early in children, and because these
effects then have long-lasting consequences, there is
a compelling argument to intervene early in ways that
will reduce these consequences. The home-visiting
approach rests on precisely this argument.
The California Backdrop

The home-visiting landscape in California is complicated by virtue of a large number of overlapping
providers, funding sources, and target populations. We
first review the two main home-visiting programs and
then turn to four subsidiary programs that are targeted
to more specific problems or populations.
The California Home Visiting Program: The California
Home Visiting Program provides comprehensive and
coordinated in-home services for pregnant women or
mothers of children (up to age 5) residing in at-risk communities. There are currently 22 federally funded sites
using services based on one of two nationally recognized home visiting models, either Healthy Families
America (HFA) or the Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP).
Under the Healthy Families America model, home
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visiting is carried out with trained workers who use a
standardized assessment tool to identify needs and
then educate new or expectant parents on child health,
positive parenting, and available services. The second
prong of the California Home Visiting Program is based
on the Nurse-Family Partnership model. Whereas the
Healthy Families America model relies on trained workers, the Nurse-Family Partnership model instead relies
on nurses who provide information and support to firsttime mothers throughout their pregnancy and until their
babies reach two years of age.20
First 5 California: The second main home-visiting initiative is supported by First 5 California, which provides
funds to county commissions to deliver local programs
in child development, child health, and family functioning. In total, First 5 supports 58 county commissions, of
which 22 invest in home-visiting programs for newborns
and parents after hospital discharge. These programs
send trained professionals into homes to support firsttime, teen, low-income, and rural parents. The First 5
program also provides parenting and early education
services.21
Disability programs: The balance of California’s homevisiting initiatives are more narrowly targeted to particular
types of problems or to particular populations. The Early
Start Program, for example, involves home visiting for
families with infants or toddlers who have disabilities or
developmental delays. The Department of Developmental Services (DDS) also operates Regional Centers that
offer home visiting for older children (3-21 years old)
with developmental disabilities.
Mental health programs: The Pathways to Well Being
initiative, which was created under the Katie A. Settlement, provides mental health services for children in
foster care or at risk of entering foster care. The services
provided under this initiative often entail home visiting.22
Child abuse and neglect programs: The case management services delivered by the Child Welfare Services
entail frequent home visits to safeguard children who
may be at risk of abuse or neglect. These services are
provided to all at-risk children (including those in foster
care).
American Indian Infant Health Program: This program,
which serves five counties, involves home visitations for
at-risk American Indian families with children under 5
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years old. The program uses either public health nurses
or paraprofessionals to provide information about health
care and available services.
As this list reveals, California’s home-visiting landscape
is quite complicated, with various providers, many
funding streams, different protocols for delivering assistance, different subpopulations that are served, and a
wide mix of targeted problems (e.g., mental health, child
abuse). It also bears noting that CalWORKs, which is
California’s main welfare-to-work program, provides
home-visiting services as well, although these visits are
typically not directed as explicitly to health and mental
health issues as the foregoing programs are.
The Proposal

The home-visiting landscape in California is complicated
by virtue of a large number of overlapping providers,
funding sources, and target populations. The current
tapestry of programs is a patchwork affair that misses
some at-risk families and is often focused on narrowly
delineated health problems rather than the larger family
situation. The home-visiting program might accordingly
be reformed by improving both the breadth and depth of
services. These two objectives—expanding the number
of families served and expanding the breadth of services offered—may be best secured by establishing a
centrally coordinated delivery system (possibly similar
to the Regional Centers operated by the DDS). Although
an exact estimate of unmet need is unavailable, the
best data suggest that approximately 465,000 California
families with children up to age 5 are in CPM poverty,
have young children, and are not currently being served
by the California Home Visiting Program or the Early
Start Program.23
The Evidence

The case for home-visiting programs is backed by a
large body of randomized controlled trials and other
high-quality research that demonstrates their effectiveness.24 The U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services has designated a number of home-visiting
models as evidence-based, but we focus here on the
research evaluating the Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP)
and Healthy Families America (HFA), as both are featured in the California Home Visiting Program. Because
HFA has been implemented differently in different sites,
the findings from HFA evaluations are harder to evaluate. There is, however, much available research on HFA,
including 34 studies in 25 states, of which 8 are ran-
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domized controlled trials.25 Although a wide range of
outcomes have been evaluated for both NFP and HFA,
we concentrate here on such key outcomes as health,
education, and economic self-sufficiency.
Health effects: The health benefits of NFP and HFA are
clear and overwhelming. Although the specifics of the
results differ across NFP and HFA, the general pattern
is one of reduced child abuse, increased home safety,
reduced emergency medical care, and improved developmental outcomes.26 Likewise, there are clear health
benefits for participating mothers, including improved
prenatal health (e.g., reduced hypertensive disorders,
reduced cigarette smoking).27
Education effects: The research evidence on cognitive
development and school readiness is also favorable.
The children participating in home-visiting programs
have been shown to be more attentive, to regulate their
behavior better, and to develop better language skills. In
a well-known randomized controlled trial, six-year-olds
enrolled in an NFP “demonstrated higher intellectual
functioning and receptive vocabulary scores… and had
fewer behavioral problems,” as compared to children
treated with minimal support services.28
Parental self-sufficiency: The foregoing health and educational benefits should parlay into improved outcomes
for children over the very long run (as they enter college
and ultimately the labor force). But we also care about
the economic situation of the parents receiving home
visits. Do HFA and NFP lead to a reduced use of social
programs and improved employment outcomes? The
answer to this question is resoundingly positive in the
case of NFP. According to a recent meta-analysis, only
two studies showed ambiguous or unfavorable outcomes on self-sufficiency, whereas 20 studies showed
significant improvements. The results for HFA are rather
more ambiguous. In the same meta-analysis, only three
of the reviewed studies showed a positive impact on
family self-sufficiency, whereas two showed an unfavorable or ambiguous effect and 37 showed no effect at
all.29
The simple conclusion is that extending services to
all at-risk families in California will, at minimum, yield
substantial health dividends.30 We don’t have as clear
evidence on the payoff to expanding the model to provide case management, program coordination, and

program referrals.31 It bears noting that the most successful home visiting programs have typically been
those that maintain a high degree of fidelity to the
model.32 Moreover, insofar as any revisions to the model
are made, they are most likely to be successful when
they take the form of simple and self-contained additions.33 The implication is that, were a broader array of
case management services indeed built into the model,
the extension should probably take a straightforward
form (e.g., a checklist of services) and should be rigorously tested to ensure that it’s delivering benefits.
The skeptic might worry that home-visiting programs
address symptoms rather than causes and therefore do
not cut to the heart of California’s poverty problem. In
evaluating this claim, it is useful to distinguish between
(a) the poverty arising from problems with labor supply (e.g., underinvestment in human capital), and (b) the
poverty arising from problems on the demand side (e.g.,
shortage of jobs, excess of low-wage jobs). The homevisiting program of course addresses the supply side
of the problem. As we’ve just discussed, there may be
some immediate effects of home-visiting programs on
parental human capital and self-sufficiency, but homevisiting programs mainly operate in the long run by
affecting the future self-sufficiency of children growing
up in families that have experienced those programs.
That is, insofar as poverty in its unchecked form leads
to various health, cognitive, and other developmental problems, a home-visiting program has protective
effects that can ultimately improve the capacity of atrisk children to make human capital investments (e.g.,
investments in a college education). If there are enough
high-quality training slots to accommodate this new
capacity for investment (e.g., enough college scholarships), then home visiting programs will reduce the
number of low-skill workers and increase the number
of high-skill workers. The poverty rate will accordingly
be reduced, not just because the children from homevisiting programs are more likely to develop the skills
that bring about higher wages, but also because there
will be fewer low-skill workers and hence less in the way
of wage-reducing competition among them. It follows
that, under the foregoing quite plausible assumptions,
a home-visiting program can be understood as a systemic response to California’s poverty. It obviously will
not eliminate poverty, but it can reduce it in a sustained
and fundamental way.
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There are, as we have noted, a few key assumptions
behind this line of reasoning. We have assumed, for
example, that the ramped-up home visiting program will
be paired with a ramped-up commitment to providing
the education (e.g., vocational training, college) that the
new demand for human capital investment will make
necessary. It would of course be wasteful to increase
our children’s capacity for human capital investments
without also increasing California’s capacity to meet the
resulting new demand for training opportunities. Put differently, a successful home visiting program will create
a new bulge at the bottom of the training pipeline, a
bulge that some fifteen years later will need to be met
by increasing opportunities at the top of that pipeline
(e.g., high-quality college slots, high-quality vocational
training slots).
The more proximate need, of course, will be to develop
the new capacities that will appear in the middle of this
pipeline. If an expanded home visiting program yields
the expected health and cognitive gains for very young
children, the logical follow-up is to cultivate those gains
by ramping up opportunities to participate in early childhood education. We therefore turn next to a discussion
of early childhood education programs and how they
might indeed be “ramped up.”

Early Childhood Education
The home visiting program arguably takes the earlyintervention approach to its logical limit by intervening
prenatally. Although early childhood education (ECE)
programs of course start after birth, they are still understood as a classic example of an early intervention
approach. The empirical rationale for these programs is
much the same as that for home visiting: The available
evidence suggests that key cognitive and behavioral
inequalities are typically established before children
begin formal schooling and sometimes do not increase
all that much thereafter. The income gap in achievement
tests, for example, is already very large when children
enter kindergarten and remains much the same size as
children progress through elementary school.34 The purpose of ECE is to take up where home visiting programs
left off by providing the early experiences, stimulation,
and training that can prevent such a large gap from
emerging before children enter kindergarten.
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The California Backdrop

In California, the commitment to early childhood education is already substantial, with a number of programs
in play. The most important programs are the following:
General Child Care: Operated by public or private agencies, General Child Care occurs in centers and family
child care home networks, with the funding coming
from both state and federal sources. Although some
older children with exceptional needs are provided
General Child Care, it is mainly offered to children from
birth through 12 years of age.
California State Preschool Program: The California
State Preschool Program, which is the largest statefunded preschool program in the country, serves 3- to
4-year-olds with both part-day and full-day services. It
is administered through local education agencies, colleges, nonprofits, and community action agencies.
Alternative Payment Program: Using both state and
federal funding, the Alternative Payment Program (APP)
helps families select and arrange child care services,
with the payment then made directly to the provider.
The APP was established to increase parental choice
and accommodate the individual needs of the family.
CalWORKs Child Care: Under the CalWORKs program,
three stages of child care programming is provided,
each drawing on state and federal funding. The first
stage, which begins when a participant enters the CalWORKs grant program, may be delivered via the APP
program or via direct payments to providers. The second stage begins when the family situation is stabilized,
and the third stage begins two years after families stop
receiving cash aid. The second and third stages are
both delivered through the APP.
Head Start and Early Head Start: The Head Start programs, which are of course federally funded, serve
children from birth to 5 years of age with both part-day
and full-day programs. Although they rely on federal
funding, California’s Head Start programs are administered through agencies that typically also have contracts
to administer either General Child Care or the California
State Preschool Program (and often these programs are
accordingly located at the same site).
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As with home visiting programs, this is a relatively complicated patchwork of programs, which perhaps argues
for simplifying access for families by establishing a
more integrated system (see Restructuring California’s
Child Care and Development System for a comprehensive proposal in this regard).35 There is, however,
already some coordinative work. In each of California’s
58 counties, local child care and development planning councils support the coordination of child care
services, with their mandate being to conduct assessments of county child care needs and to prepare plans
to address identified needs.
The more important problem with the current system
is that it is underfunded. Because of this underfunding,
it has proven difficult to meet demand and to provide
sufficiently high quality care. We elaborate these points
below.
Meeting demand: There are two main roads into a state
or federally subsidized ECE program in California. The
first road, the one via CalWORKs, brings a guarantee
of child care subsidies.36 The second road, the one for
non-CalWORKs families, does not entail a guarantee,
indeed there are long waiting lists for non-CalWORKs
families. Although these families meet income eligibility
requirements (i.e., less than 70 percent of the state’s
median income in 2007–08),37 funding is inadequate to
satisfy the demand. The upshot is that many low-income
families are not receiving ECE.38 According to the latest
data, only 37 percent of 3- and 4-year-olds below 200
percent of the official poverty line are enrolled in preschool (public or private), whereas 56 percent of their
higher-income counterparts are so enrolled.39 If ECE
subsidies were extended, this enrollment gap would
clearly be reduced, although some of the gap arises
from factors other than financial need.
Improving quality: There is also ample room to improve
the quality of the state’s ECE system. As discussed
below, the quality issue is all important, given the evidence that high-quality ECE may be especially effective
in reducing poverty. The last systematic assessment of
the quality of California’s ECE was completed in 2007
and showed that poorer children were disproportionately found in preschools with larger class sizes, a less
emotionally supportive environment, and lower student engagement.40 Following this report, the California
Department of Education developed the Preschool

Learning Foundations (PLF), a guide for early learning and cognitive development that is aligned with the
state’s kindergarten curriculum. Although the PLF curriculum is not required, it is intended to guide curricular
choices in state-sponsored preschools and improve
quality in all ECE programs. Unfortunately, the most
recent evidence suggests that ECE quality in California is still lagging, indeed the National Institute for Early
Education Research (NIEER) ranks California’s preschool quality in the bottom tier of U.S. states.41
The Proposal

The preceding review makes it clear that (a) there aren’t
enough ECE slots in California for low-income children,
and (b) the available slots are not all of adequate quality.
If one were to craft an ECE reform, it should accordingly
address either or both of these deficiencies:
Increase the number of ECE slots: The number of ECE
slots should be increased to ensure that all demand
from low-income families is met.42
Improve the quality of ECE slots: The quality of existing
or new ECE slots should be increased to meet structural
and processual targets (e.g., class size, quality of student engagement).
We review below the evidence on the likely payoff to
either of these reforms. Although there is much highquality research on both types of interventions, the task
of summarizing this research is complicated because,
as extensive as such research is, it nonetheless does
not resolve all questions of interest.
The Evidence

In discussing the evidence, the standard and natural
starting place is the now-famous evidence on two intensive and small-scale programs, the Perry Preschool and
Abecedarian programs.43 The Perry Preschool study
was based on an experiment with random assignment
of low-income African-American children to either the
experimental condition (i.e., attending the Perry Preschool) or a control group that entered kindergarten at
age 5. In the experimental condition, children attended
the preschool from ages 3 to 5, with classes meeting
2.5 hours per day for 5 days per week. The program
included weekly home visits with the children and their
parents (and in this regard may be understood as an
amalgam of home visiting and conventional preschool
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programs). The key result: The members of the treatment group increased their cognitive and noncognitive
skills as well as earnings, were less likely to be arrested,
and were less dependent on social programs. The
Abecedarian program, which was similar in intensity,
yielded roughly comparable results.
Are such positive results only found in small-scale
programs? Absolutely not. The best-known study of a
public preschool program, the Chicago Child-Parent
Centers, showed effects similar in size to those of the
Perry and Abecedarian programs.44 There have likewise
been very promising results in the Boston Public School
Pre-K Program.45 The average ECE effect across all
programs is sizable: In a recent meta-analysis of 123
quasi-experimental and experimental studies of ECE
programs, the long-term effects on cognitive outcomes
(e.g., test scores), school progress (e.g., high-school
graduation), and socio-emotional development were all
found to be quite large.46
The main interpretive complexity is that randomized trial
assessments of Head Start (HS) and Early Head Start
(EHS) have yielded less favorable results.47 Although
HS and EHS initially have positive effects on various
cognitive measures, these effects tend to disappear
by the end of kindergarten (i.e., effect “washout” ). The
rate of fadeout for present-day cohorts appears to be
faster than has been observed for children who were in
Head Start in the 1960s through 1980s.48 For this earlier
cohort, the effect on test scores persists, indeed longterm impacts on adult outcomes are approximately 80
percent as large as those for small-scale programs,
like Perry Preschool and Abecedarian. There is much
debate about why HS effects appear to be washing
out more quickly now.49 The “catch-up hypothesis,”
which is very plausible, has it that elementary schools
are becoming increasingly successful at remediating
deficits among children who enter kindergarten without
the benefit of preschool. That is, rather than recent HS
participants experiencing “fade-out,” we may be seeing
recent non-participants “catching up” through increasingly intensive remediation in elementary schools. The
catch-up hypothesis implies that this more aggressive
remediation has only become possible because HS
has reduced the number of under-performing students
delivered to the schools.
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The evidence is likewise unclear on the matter of
whether California should increase the number of ECE
slots, increase the quality of existing ECE slots, or opt
for both at once. The main concern in this regard is that
we do not yet have a fully developed science on what
makes for “high-quality” ECE. If we commit to ramping
up quality, it is essential that we exploit what is already
known, build in high-quality experimentation across
counties, and move swiftly to best practices as the science continues to develop.50

Late Childhood Interventions
We have to this point reviewed two rather early interventions (i.e., home visiting, early childhood education).
Although the evidence behind these interventions is
strong, there is also compelling evidence on behalf
of many later educational interventions, evidence to
which we will now turn. The lifecourse is studded with
a series of critical junctures, some of which occur very
early in life (e.g., early brain development), but others of
which occur later on (e.g., college entry).51 If we do not
address these later critical junctures as well as the early
ones, we will not fully exploit the increased capacity for
human capital investments secured by ramping up early
childhood experiences. The task before us, therefore, is
to identify the late childhood junctures that are blocking
children from investing in human capital.
This line of reasoning leads us directly to those junctures at which children decide to undertake high-quality
vocational training and to prepare for, apply to, attend,
and complete college. As Figure 4 showed, the chances
of being poor are one in two for high-school dropouts
(53.9%) and one in three for high-school graduates
(33.2%), but less than one in ten for college graduates (9.8%). If the number of college graduates and
well-trained workers were increased, the State would
accordingly secure real and tangible benefits in the form
of reduced program spending and increased income
taxes.52 It is especially important to increase college
investments given that the shortage of college-educated
workers will, according to the best available projections,
likely worsen in California over the next decade.53 The
best possible source from which to draw these new college-educated workers is in fact low-income families:
That is, students from disadvantaged backgrounds are
not just the least likely to attend college, but they are
also the most likely to secure economic benefits from
college.54
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It is therefore especially important to identify those
blockages late in the lifecourse that prevent students
from attending college or undertaking high-quality
vocational training.55 As we have repeatedly noted, the
two-pronged virtue of increasing human capital investments is that (a) those who make them are less at risk
for poverty, and (b) those who do not make them are
competing against a depleted pool of low-skill laborers
and hence will face less in the way of wage-reducing
and employment-reducing competition for the available
low-skill jobs.
The California Backdrop

There are many programs and institutions designed to
assist the State’s low-income children as they negotiate primary and secondary school. We review below
the key features of this programmatic and institutional
landscape.
Title 1: The most prominent federal effort to help
low-income students is Title 1 of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965. This program is
intended to equalize educational opportunities and is
used for such purposes as dropout prevention, funding assistance for the Advanced Placement exam, and
supplementary reading and literacy programs.
LCFF: The shift to the Local Control Funding Formula
(LCFF) within California provides supplemental funds
to districts with high proportions of high-need students
(i.e., low-income students, foster youth, English learners). At the same time, LCFF allows school districts
to more flexibly allocate funds across programs, while
also requiring them to document educational outcomes
of students.
Community Schools: In some California communities,
the school serves as a hub for connecting low-income
students and their family to services and programs,
such as CalFresh. This “community school” model
sometimes takes a modest form (with relatively few
linked organizations and services) and sometimes a
more aggressive form. The Promise Neighborhood initiative, which is reviewed below, may be understood as
an especially well-developed and elaborated rendition
of the community school.56
Summer and after-school programs: Because lowincome children experience large learning losses during

the summer, many schools and community organizations have instituted high-quality summer enrichment
programs (e.g., “Summer Matters”), with funding from
federal, state, and private sources. These summer
programs are supplemented with a wide range of afterschool programs funded by the After School Education
and Safety Program (a voter-approved initiative passed
in 2002) as well as other federal and non-profit sources.
College preparation and access programs: There are a
variety of programs designed to increase college application and enrollment by providing low-income students
with extra advising, tutoring, peer mentoring, test
preparation, academic enrichment, information about
admission requirements, and financial aid workshops
(e.g., Cal-SOAP, Cash-for-College, Early Academic Outreach Programs, Early Commitment to College).
The preceding list pertains only to programming within
primary and secondary schools (and is but a partial list
of even that class of programming). It therefore omits
(a) the loan, grant, and work-study programs designed
to increase low-income access to colleges and (b) the
many programs designed to raise completion rates
among low-income students already attending college.57
The Proposal

There is a sizable scientific literature on the effectiveness
of Title 1 programs,58 community schools,59 summer
and after-school programs,60 and college preparation
and access programs.61 The evidence on these programs indicates that many are effective and serve the
low-income population well. As the Local Control Funding Formula is implemented in California, children from
disadvantaged families may have increased access to
many of these programs, thus equalizing opportunities
within the later lifecourse.
This is not to suggest that California should rely exclusively on the changes that the LCFF may bring about.
The State would do well to additionally exploit a newer
class of informational and social-psychological interventions that, by building on these programs, offer
unprecedented opportunities for substantial returns at
very low cost. The simple insight behind these interventions is that many key investments (e.g., going to college)
require students to overcome entrenched impediments
to good decision-making and follow through.62 These
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impediments can be overcome with informational and
social-psychological interventions that have been
rigorously tested and can now be incorporated into
California’s existing programming at low cost:
A social-psychological intervention: A series of brief
training exercises can reverse debilitating beliefs about
capacities and lead to sizable and long-lasting gains in
academic achievement.
Informational support: By providing better information
and waiving application fees, low-income students
with a record of superior achievement will apply to and
attend colleges that are well matched to their capacities
and talents.
A text-messaging intervention: A low-cost program
of personalized (but automated) text messages can
increase college attendance among low-income students.
These seemingly small interventions, all rigorously
tested with high-quality research designs, have been
shown to yield returns that would likely repay the relatively low costs of implementing them.
The Evidence

We begin with the case of informational support. The
well-known problem here is that high-achieving students from low-income families often opt against going
to college or choose poorly-performing colleges that
do not fully exploit their capacities or maximize their
chances of graduating. Although this problem could be
addressed by hiring more high-school advisors, a costeffective alternative is to cull the relevant test and grade
data and send individualized information to low-income
students indicating appropriate college matches,
financial options, and how to apply. The relevant experimental results are very strong: When a treatment group
is sent this information and provided fee waivers, their
rates of application, acceptance, and enrollment are
substantially higher than those of the control group.63
The estimated per-student cost of this intervention is
very low.

had striking and lasting effects on educational achievement. The evidence shows, for example, that a sharp
increase in math achievement is observed when middle-school students attend an eight-session workshop
teaching them that cognitive capacity, far from being
determined at birth, is in fact malleable because “the
brain is like a muscle and grows with effort.”64 There
is currently research under way demonstrating how
these and related interventions can be taken to scale
and reduce the growing achievement gap between poor
and well-off students.
The third intervention aims at increasing the rate at
which low-income students show up for their first year
of college (after having been accepted). At the cost
of approximately $7 per student, attendance rates
for low-income students can be increased by sending automated (but personalized) text messages that
(a) remind them of important tasks to complete as the
beginning of the term approaches, and (b) refer them to
other support services as necessary.65 The latter costs
can be recovered via reduced program costs and higher
earnings (and accordingly higher tax revenues).
These three interventions proceed from the recognition
that big problems are sometimes amenable to highly
targeted and narrow-gauge solutions. Although there
is no disputing that early childhood education yields
higher payoffs than conventional late interventions (e.g.,
conventional job training programs), it is not clear that
it yields any higher payoffs than these targeted informational and social-psychological interventions.66 The
simple point here: Because there are several critical
junctures in human capital formation, a smart anti-poverty policy will take on each of them, not just the early
ones. The objective, then, is a comprehensive supplyside policy that intervenes at all of the high-payoff
junctures and thereby prevents blockages from emerging at any point in the supply chain for skilled labor. It
bears noting that, while the late interventions featured
here have compelling evidence behind them, a host of
others also hold promise and might be developed into a
fuller suite of late interventions.67

Workforce Development
Are there equally inexpensive interventions that affect
actual achievement? Indeed there are. Over the last
decade, a series of randomized field experiments have
shown that small social-psychological interventions targeting thoughts, feelings, and beliefs about school have
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We next consider workforce training programs that
typically entail intervening after secondary schooling
has been completed. These programs, which have not
always performed well in evaluation studies, are sometimes pitched as the prototypic low-return alternative to
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high-return early investments.68 Although the evidence
for workforce training programs is indeed less attractive on average, we review here some relatively new
programs that hold promise and that warrant more substantial investments.
The simple rationale for job training programs is that
they can build skills that, in principle, increase employability and wages. That is, just as a college degree
elevates skills and qualifies workers for higher-paying
jobs, so too training programs can qualify workers for
high-skill craft, service, and technical jobs and move
them out of crowded low-wage markets. If these programs are operating well and at sufficient scale, they
will help not just those who directly participate in them
but also those who remain in the low-skill sector (by
reducing the number of competitors within that sector).
These two effects, taken together, should in theory work
to reduce poverty.
Is such theory realized in practice? There are two main
reasons why often it is not. Most obviously, insofar as
the programs in question focus on job search rather
than job training, then the foregoing skill-upgrading
effects are no longer directly in play. If there are nonetheless poverty-reducing effects of such programs, they
arise principally because recipients can transition more
rapidly into available low-wage jobs. These programs
allow, in other words, the market to clear more quickly.
The second and equally obvious caveat is that training programs will only yield a return when they develop
skills that are in high demand. The latter point argues
for “sectoral programs” in which the type of training
on offer is adjusted to reflect the needs of expanding
sectors. The available evidence on sectoral programs,
which is reviewed below, suggests that they can yield
sizable returns.
California Backdrop

The main fiscal backdrop to this discussion is an ongoing shift in federal support from job training to higher
education. The federal funding for the Pell Grant Program, which provides vouchers covering college tuition
and related expenses for low-income students, dwarfs
that for job training.69
The commitment to job search and job training nonetheless remains substantial and takes place in community
colleges, American Job Center offices, and a variety of
CalWORKs programs. The community colleges offer a

host of state-funded training programs; the American
Job Centers, which are federally funded, provide job
search and job training opportunities; and CalWORKs
operates a variety of programs to transition clients into
work. With the new Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), just passed in 2014, the training
landscape in California will likely shift somewhat. The
new act will consolidate training and search programs,
promote sectoral training for high-demand industries
and occupations, and improve services to individuals
with disabilities. Although California’s one-stop centers
now mainly provide job search assistance, it is possible
that WIOA will promote a shift to job training.70
The Proposal

The evidence reviewed below suggests that the ongoing transition to sectoral programs is sound policy. With
the implementation of WIOA, the transition to sectoral
training will likely continue and may even intensify, but
additional changes in California’s system of financing
community colleges may also be required. Because the
technical training for California’s emerging sectors is
often more costly to offer, the current system of financing, which is based on a simple per-student formula,
does not always provide adequate incentives to offer
the courses that are most needed.71
The Evidence

The evidence on the effectiveness of workforce development programs is extensive and often high quality.
There are three key results coming out of this literature.
Modest effects of general training programs: The best
and most recent estimates of the returns to general
training programs reveal a modest increase in the earnings of disadvantaged adults who undergo training.72
These increases, which tend to be larger for women
than for men, are mainly attributable to increases in
hours worked rather than higher wages. Although some
of these effects fade over time, most analysts find that
they are still large enough to be cost-effective (albeit not
necessarily as cost-effective as early childhood interventions).73
Modest effects of mandatory employment and training
programs: There is also a substantial literature on the
effects of employment and training programs for welfare
recipients. These programs, which are often mandatory,
tend to be most effective when participants are not
mandated to first engage in job search before turning
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to training.74 The evidence suggests that, for low-skill
workers and those with outdated skills, job training programs have larger effects on employability and earnings
than job search programs.75
Sectoral programs may yield larger effects: The sectoral
approach to workforce development targets training to
particular employers that need workers or to particular sectors of the economy in which labor demand is
strong. These programs often combine community
college training with work experience. Although much
research on sectoral programs is now under way, the
evidence accumulated to date shows that participants
in sectoral programs are more likely to be employed and
have substantially higher earnings.76 In some cases,
employers have been resistant to sectoral programs
that target the disadvantaged, but this reluctance can
be overcome.
These results suggest that, insofar as any supplementary investments in workforce development are made,
sectoral approaches may well yield the highest payoff.
Because community colleges have become the center
of contemporary workforce development, this ongoing
shift to sectoral programs may be best promoted by
developing new funding formulas that incentivize community colleges to carry out training in high-demand
fields and to work in close collaboration with relevant
employers.

Creating Jobs and Making Work Pay
The equal opportunity approach, which focuses on
upgrading the skills and capacities of California’s
labor force, might be criticized for ignoring the role of
low-paying jobs and inadequate demand in generating poverty. After all, if the main problem is that there
aren’t enough jobs and the available jobs just don’t
pay enough, shouldn’t we take the bull by the horns
by simply increasing the number of jobs and the pay
of existing jobs? We address this criticism by turning
to demand-side approaches that address poverty by
(a) directly creating jobs for the disadvantaged, and (b)
supplementing the income, via tax credits, of those who
are working in low-wage jobs.
The demand-side approach may be understood as a
direct response to the “jobs problem” in California. The
unemployment rate in California, currently at 7.0 per-
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cent, is the 3rd highest in the country; the discouraged
worker rate, which includes those who have “given up”
looking for work, is the 5th highest in the country; and
the labor force underutilization rate, which also takes
into account underemployment and marginal forms
of attachment, is the second highest in the country.77
Whereas a labor-supply approach addresses the jobs
problem by attempting to shift workers into sectors
where demand is higher (i.e., high-skill sectors), there is
also a long history of addressing it by directly expanding employment opportunities for the hard-to-employ.
This approach has been viewed as especially attractive
in raising employment rates for groups (e.g., blacks)
that face discrimination even when they have the requisite skills.
There are of course two types of “job problems” in
California. The first problem, as was just discussed, is
that there aren’t enough jobs, while the second problem is that the available jobs often do not pay enough
to protect against poverty. The second problem, like
the first one, could be addressed with a labor-supply
approach: By increasing their skills, workers are more
likely to escape the low-wage sector, which not only
raises their own wages but also tamps down wagelowering competition among those still in that sector.
The demand-side approach takes on the same problem
more directly by supplementing the income of low-wage
workers via the minimum wage or the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC). Because there are ongoing efforts to
further raise California’s mimimum wage, the comments
below will focus on the possibility of a parallel effort to
increase the EITC.78
We have suggested that wages in the low-skill sector are
unduly low because the sector is flooded with workers
who have not had a full and open opportunity to secure
higher skills. The approaches discussed in the prior
sections are intended to equalize such opportunities:
We need to expand home-visiting programs because
we want all children, no matter how rich or poor their
parents, to be raised in environments that protect their
health and develop their capacities; we need to expand
early childhood education because we want all children,
no matter how rich or poor their parents, to be raised in
environments in which those capacities are cultivated
and have an opportunity to flourish; and we turn to latechildhood interventions because we want all children,
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no matter how rich or poor their parents, to have full and
complete access to college or other training opportunities. It will of course take more time than we would like
for these opportunity-equalizing programs to bear fruit.
If tax credits are applied now, we can immediately raise
the pay of low-skill workers and thereby compensate,
if only partially, for the reduced opportunities that most
of them faced earlier in their lives. Although the need
for such wage support will lessen as soon as opportunities are equalized, there is a pressing need to prop
up wages now given that the low-skill sector is flooded
with workers who did not have many opportunities.
It also bears noting that any meaningful commitment to
equal opportunity must go beyond such wage support
by addressing the legal and institutional sources of poverty. The careful reader will note that—to this point—our
discussion has followed convention by conflating antipoverty policy with safety net policy. This conflation,
however conventional, is deeply problematic. After all,
wages and unemployment are also directly affected by
a host of legal and institutional practices that are quite
unrelated to the safety net itself, practices that lead to
(a) systematic failures to pay workers for overtime and
other work hours (i.e., “wage theft”), (b) an especially
high risk of incarceration for children born into poverty
(notably African Americans), and (c) employment discrimination against mothers, many racial and ethnic
groups, undocumented immigrants, and the formerly
incarcerated. These various forms of discrimination,
each of which is inconsistent with a commitment to fair
pay and equal opportunity, can be addressed through
legal reform and improved enforcement (much of which
can be implemented at the state level).

employment program in 2009 and 2010. Although this
emergency funding is no longer available, CalWORKs
has nonetheless continued a subsidized employment
program, allocating $39.3 million to it in fiscal year 201314. This program creates fully or partially subsidized
jobs in partnership with private employers, non-profits,
and public agencies.
Hiring credits: The California Enterprise Zone program
provided tax credits to businesses in economically
depressed areas for hiring “disadvantaged” workers.
This program, which was eliminated in 2013, has been
replaced by a hiring credit for businesses in census
tracts with high unemployment and poverty rates.80 The
federal equivalent, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit,
provides tax credits to employers who hire from certain
target groups that have faced barriers to employment.81
Earned Income Tax Credit: The EITC, which is of course
a federal program, is designed to supplement income
for low-earnings workers. For households with very low
earnings, the dollar amount of the EITC increases as
earnings rise, a design that incentivizes work. In recent
years, approximately 20 percent of California tax filers
qualified for the EITC, with the average filer receiving
$2,302 (in 2012).
It is conventional to treat subsidized employment,
hiring credits for employers, and the EITC as very different programs. For our purposes, they are usefully
classed together because all of them treat poverty as a
demand-side problem that is best addressed by either
(a) creating more jobs (via subsidies or tax credits to
businesses), or (b) reducing the number of “poverty
jobs” (via tax credits to low-earning workers).

The California Backdrop

In California, a wide range of demand-side initiatives are
in play, initiatives that rely either on subsidized employment programs or on income supplementation, via tax
credits, for low-wage workers.79 These initiatives fall
into the following three classes.
Subsidized employment programs: In a subsidized
employment program, jobs are provided for those
who cannot find employment in the regular labor market, with public funds used to pay all or some of their
wages. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) allowed CalWORKs to expand its subsidized

The Proposal

Because the evidence for subsidized employment is
quite mixed (as will be discussed), the most promising
demand-side approach is to create a California State
EITC. To date, 26 states have their own state-funded
EITCs, usually taking the simple form of a fixed percentage of the federal credit. If the federal EITC were
supplemented by ten percent, California would be a
“middle-of-the-pack” state (relative to other states currently providing supplementation).
The second and equally important class of wage-
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enhancing and job-creating reforms are those that
address unfair pay and employment practices. We are
referring here to legal and institutional reforms that
eliminate wage theft, unequal and discriminatory risks
of incarceration, as well as employment and pay discrimination against mothers, disadvantaged racial and
ethnic groups, undocumented workers, and the formerly incarcerated.
The Evidence

As noted below, there is a long history of interest in public sector employment for the poor, indeed it extends
back to the War on Poverty. Although President Johnson
rejected proposals at that time for a substantial job creation program, a few relatively modest programs were
created in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Neighborhood
Youth Corps [NYC], Work Incentives Program [WIN],
Job Opportunities in the Business Sector [JOBS], Comprehensive Employment and Training Act [CETA]). In the
late 1970s, President Carter expanded CETA, especially
its programs for public sector employment for the poor.
Under the Carter administration, tax credits to private
employers were also used to expand job opportunities
for certain categories of disadvantaged workers, an initiative tagged the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (and now
renamed the Work Opportunity Tax Credit).
These initiatives are of interest because they provide
an opportunity to examine the effectiveness of direct
job creation. The two main questions of interest are (a)
whether the participants in these programs experienced
long-term benefits (on earnings, employment, and other
labor market outcomes), and (b) whether the programs
work to increase overall employment. The evidence on
both questions has been mixed.
On the matter of long-term benefits to participants, the
evidence shows that they are typically quite modest,
except when the jobs programs also provided an intensive set of support services to the participants.82 In a
careful meta-analysis of 97 studies, it was recently concluded that “subsidized public sector jobs programs are
generally less successful” than job search and training
programs, a result that reinforces much of the previous
research on this question.83
The results on the second question are equally mixed.
On the positive side, there is some evidence that subsidized public sector jobs can generate a net increase
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in employment, although only when the programs carefully target the types of jobs that are created and the
types of workers who are employed.84 With such careful
targeting, it is not the case that public sector employment simply substitutes for private sector employment,
in the end yielding no net increase in employment.85
Although the available evidence suggests, then, that a
net increase in employment can be generated, it has
to be borne in mind that costs per participant may be
high. The benefits of employer tax credits (e.g., the
Work Opportunity Tax Credit) are even less clear: The
oft-noted problem with such programs is that firms can
benefit from participation even without changing their
hiring practices. Indeed, when firms participating in tax
credit programs were surveyed by the Department of
Labor, only 10 percent reported any change or modification of their hiring practices for purposes of securing
the credit.86
It is results such as the foregoing that have led most
scholars to conclude that the EITC is a preferred
approach. This conclusion is based in part on the
now overwhelming evidence that the EITC increases
employment and earnings.87 When the EITC has been
expanded, the increases in employment among families
with children are quite substantial, especially among
those with female family heads.88 The downstream
benefits of the EITC are likewise impressive: The EITC
improves the mental and physical health of mothers,
reduces the likelihood of low birth-weights, improves
the performance of children on cognitive tests, and
increases college enrollment.89 Although we have
emphasized the direct effects of the EITC on compensation, this extra money delivered to parents makes it
into a supply-side intervention as well. When parental
income is increased, children are raised in healthier and
less stressful circumstances, which in turn positions
them to make more substantial human capital investments. This is why Hilary Hoynes recently concluded
that the EITC may “ultimately be judged one of the most
successful labor market innovations in U.S. history.”90
Does it follow that an expanded EITC could fully solve
California’s poverty problem? This seems rather unlikely.
If an EITC supplement were adopted in California, many
families in deep poverty would simply not benefit from
it. From its inception, the EITC has been intended to
incentivize work, which means that families without
workers will not directly benefit from it. The ongoing rise
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of nonworking poverty would therefore go quite unaddressed by a typical EITC-based reform.91 This suggests
that, insofar as a state EITC were adopted, it should
be coupled with other reforms, especially increased
CalWORKs funding, that assist those in even more profound need. The equal opportunity reforms discussed
above may be usefully paired with a ramped-up EITC
precisely because such reforms would assist children
and adults in more profound need.
This part of the equal opportunity plan, unlike the
foregoing parts (i.e., home visiting, early childhood education), thus relies on cash transfers or tax credits. Are
such transfers or credits difficult to reconcile with core
U.S. values? Absolutely not. The EITC is consistent
with the country’s values not just because it ensures
that “work pays” but also because it compensates for
the reduced opportunities that most recipients faced
earlier in their lives. This is not, however, the only way
in which income transfers are opportunity-equalizing
interventions. The EITC and CalWORKs also equalize

opportunities for the next generation: That is, by raising
the income of poor families, the EITC and CalWORKs
act to level the playing field for the children raised in
these families. There is growing evidence that, when
income is transferred to poor families, the children in
these families ultimately grow up healthier, have higher
earnings, and work longer hours.92
The legal and institutional reforms noted above are an
equally important component of the equal opportunity
plan. Although we have focused much of our commentary on safety net reform, this complementary legal
and institutional reform cuts to the heart of any commitment to equal opportunity and must accordingly be
understood as central to any meaningful equal opportunity plan. The available evidence, which suggests such
reform would dramatically raise employment and wages
in high-poverty populations, again speaks to the power
of policies that address causes (e.g., discrimination)
rather than symptoms (e.g., low pay, unemployment).93
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implementing the EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PLAN

T

he foregoing approach, which we have dubbed
the equal opportunity plan, entails bringing
together a set of cost-effective interventions
that are targeted to critical moments in the lifecourse.
Although many of these interventions (e.g., early childhood education) have been represented as “stand
alones” that suffice in and of themselves, the equalopportunity approach is distinctive by virtue of bundling
them together, addressing each of the critical junctures
in the lifecourse, and thereby endeavoring to remove
blockages at each stage in the supply chain. The payoff
to a home-visiting approach, for example, is only fully
realized insofar as the children benefiting from it can
then be “handed off” to early childhood education programs that will exploit new capacities for human capital
investment.
It is accordingly important that this sequence of programs are properly coordinated in ways that ensure a
successful “hand off.” This coordination may occur in
either a centralized or decentralized way. Under a centralized approach, the coordination problem is solved
at the state level, with representatives of state service
agencies (e.g., California Dept. of Social Services)
endeavoring to build programs that integrate well with
one another. This is of course an ongoing and imperfectly realized process.
The alternative approach, to which we’ll now turn at
length, instead approaches the coordination problem at
the local level. It recognizes that, in any given community,
the constellation of service providers is quite variable
and that community-specific plans for integrating them
are likely to be most successful. The best-known initiative of this sort, Promise Neighborhoods, may be
understood as a particular rendition of an equal opportunity approach. That is, Promise Neighborhoods also
take an intensive approach to child development, but
the onus rests on each neighborhood to develop comprehensive plans for integrating services based on input
from local non-profits, businesses, schools, municipal
governments, community residents, and social science
researchers.94 These plans describe how local constituents can come together to provide counseling for new
parents, health services, high quality education, and
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job training for youth. As this list reveals, the services
themselves are very similar to those described above
(as part of an equal opportunity approach), but they are
now being coordinated and delivered under the directive of a community-specific plan.
To date, the Promise Neighhorhood initiative has been
federally funded, with two stages of federal funding available. The first stage in becoming a Promise
Neighborhood is to apply for a small federal planning
grant (approx. $350,000–$500,000) that funds community leaders to build local relationships and ultimately
develop a comprehensive implementation plan. If that
plan is then supported, the second stage is to secure a
further multimillion-dollar “implementation grant,” again
with federal funds. The latter grant, although typically
not large enough to support direct services, can be
used to ensure that services are well coordinated and
delivered in accord with the larger community plan.95
The purpose of this section is to describe this decentralized form of service delivery in some detail. At
this point, there is not enough evidence to determine
whether the services comprising the equal opportunity
plan are best delivered in a centralized or decentralized
way, given that (a) the evidence on the effectiveness of
a decentralized approach is still accumulating, and (b)
an explicit comparison of centralized and decentralized
approaches to delivery has not been undertaken. We
will therefore simply report on such evidence as is currently available on decentralized service delivery.
The California Backdrop

To this point, we have placed special emphasis on the
Promise Neighborhood initiative, as it is the most prominent neighborhood revitalization initiative in the country
and is also quite directly focused on supply-side interventions. The current landscape of neighborhood-based
interventions in California is nonetheless rather broader
and encompasses both demand-side and supply-side
initiatives.
Promise Neighborhoods: To date, four communities in
California have received implementation grants (i.e.,
Los Angeles, Chula Vista, San Francisco, Hayward),

Why Is There So Much Poverty in California?

and another three communities have received planning
grants (i.e., Corning, Campo, Fresno).96 The Los Angeles initiative, which is the largest, is a public-private
partnership of the city, the county, and the Los Angeles Unified School District.97 The implementation grant
will be used to transform 19 neighborhood schools
into full-service community schools and to open 6
community centers and dozens of smaller satellite centers. It will offer 65 programs for youth and families in
partnership with 60 local organizations. The other communities receiving planning and implementation grants
are relying on smaller federations of schools and service
organizations.
Promise Zones: The Promise Zones initiative is a related
federal program aimed at comprehensive neighborhood
redevelopment through job creation, increased economic security, expanded educational opportunities,
increased access to affordable housing, and improved
public safety.98 Unlike Promise Neighborhoods, which
are quite relentlessly supply-side in their approach,
Promise Zones also incorporate various demand-side
interventions (e.g., job creation). The first five program
awards were announced in 2014 and included Los
Angeles as one of the sites. Although Promise Zones
do not receive any dedicated grant funding from the
federal government, they are given priority in receiving
grants from already existing federal sources.
Strong Cities, Strong Communities (SC2): The SC2 initiative, which includes Fresno in its first cohort of cities,
is likewise focused on demand-side interventions (e.g.,
economic development, job creation) as well as supplyside ones.99 Like the Promise Zones initiative, it allows
local governments to acquire and use federal funds
more effectively for transportation projects, community
development projects, and other investments.
The key problem facing California is that the demand
for Promise Neighborhoods and other neighborhood
initiatives exceeds the available funding. Although 78
communities in California have applied for planning and
implementation grants for Promise Neighborhoods, only
seven have received one or both. It is possible, then,
that an equal opportunity approach of the sort laid out
above could be implemented in a decentralized fashion
by funding a comprehensive system of Promise Neighborhoods. This initiative, which could be administered
by the State Department of Education, might reason-

ably fund both planning and implementation grants, as
in the federal initiative.100
The Evidence

It is not yet possible to rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of Promise Neighborhoods because they have
only recently been awarded. The Harlem Children’s
Zone (HCZ), which was founded in the 1970s and then
ramped up in the 1990s, has served as the inspiration
for the federal initiative and accordingly provides an
obvious opportunity for indirect evaluation of the Promise Neighborhood concept. The HCZ programs include
instruction for expecting parents, education on child
development, a full-day preschool, a charter school as
well as in-classroom and after-school support for public school students, youth development programs for
public middle-school students, and various college preparatory services.101
The most rigorous evaluation of the program exploited
the lottery for enrollment into HCZ charter schools to
compare the performance of lottery winners against
lottery losers.102 According to the lottery estimates (as
well as other instrumental variable estimates), students
who attended an HCZ charter school had much higher
math and English test scores, with the HCZ boost being
big enough to close the black-white achievement gap
in math by 9th grade and in English by 3rd grade. The
same gains in achievement were not experienced by
siblings of HCZ charter students who were ineligible to
attend the HCZ schools (due to age cut-offs). Because
these siblings did have access to the HCZ community
programs, it appears that the gains in test scores were
attributable to charter school attendance rather than
the associated community programs. Also, because
HCZ charter students from outside the zone performed
as well as those inside the zone, it would again appear
that wrap-around community services were less important (as those from outside the zone rarely used these
wrap-around services).
The preceding evaluation, although widely heralded,
has not gone unchallenged. In a follow-up assessment
by the Brookings Institution, the test scores from an
HCZ charter school were compared to those from other
non-HCZ charter schools, a design that does not exploit
the lottery for enrollment into HCZ charter schools.103
This study instead used statistical controls to adjust for
demographic and socioeconomic differences between
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the students attending HCZ and non-HCZ schools. The
results from this design were clearly less impressive:
The test scores of HCZ charter students were only in
the middling ranges when compared to test scores for
non-HCZ charter schools.
Which result is to be believed? Although we cannot
review the substantial literature on the HCZ evaluation
here, a key point is that students in the HCZ charter
school started out with much lower test scores than
those attending the non-HCZ schools in the Brookings
Institution study.104 The test scores for HCZ students
grew rapidly off this low baseline, but not rapidly enough
to catch up with the best non-HCZ scores. It follows
that the lottery design yielded a more favorable result
because it properly protected against preexisting differences between the treatment and control groups. The
nonexperimental approach, by contrast, did not fully
control for differences in baseline conditions across the
schools being compared. The consensus view, then, is
that the HCZ has yielded impressive results.
This is not to suggest that the proposed Promise Neighborhoods initiative will necessarily yield results that are
just as favorable. The main worries in this regard are
threefold:
Will a leaner version work? The HCZ costs were approximately $19,000 per student in 2009.105 This includes
$4,657 per student in HCZ-covered school costs and
$2,172 per student in after-school and wrap-around
costs. It is of course unclear whether a leaner program
will generate different results.
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Are community-based services needed? The HCZ
results called into question the returns to communitybased services. If the very favorable results were indeed
secured mainly by ramping up school quality, it might
be more cost-effective to concentrate on school reform
alone.106
Can an adequate level of coordination be achieved? The
HCZ is a highly centralized organization that operates
all charter schools and community programs under the
same umbrella. By contrast, very few of the first Promise Neighborhood planning grantees had preexisting
relationships with local schools before applying for their
implementation grants, a state of affairs that contrasts
sharply with that of the highly centralized HCZ. It is
unclear whether the high level of coordination achieved
under the centralized HCZ can be successfully reproduced in other communities.107
The latter question of coordination cuts to the heart of
the Promise Neighborhood initiative. In principle, there
is much to be said for locally-generated coordination, all
the more so because the sources and types of poverty
vary by community, the constellation of service providers varies by community, and the available resources
vary by community. What is unclear, however, is whether
a local approach can bring about the desired coordination without also adopting the centralized organizational
structure of an HCZ.108 The simple upshot: The available
science clearly establishes the value of an equal opportunity approach, but it does not yet clearly establish
whether centralized or decentralized delivery will yield
the highest payoff.
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can a case for safety net reform be made?

I

n understanding why California has so much poverty,
it is useful to distinguish between the poverty generated by (a) an economy that fails to deliver enough
jobs and, in particular, enough poverty-escaping jobs,
(b) a complex of health, family, and training institutions
that fails to provide low-income children with adequate
opportunities to develop their capacities and acquire
skills, and (c) a safety net that fails to step up and adequately remediate the damage wrought by (a) and (b)
together. We have discussed the first two sources and
now conclude our report by considering the third.
How, then, might we grade California’s safety net? If
any overall assessment is to be had, it is that the state’s
safety net is hard-pressed to cope with the very high
rates of poverty that our still-struggling economy and
deeply flawed training institutions have handed it. In the
introduction to this report, we showed that California’s
poverty rate would increase by 12.9 points (from 22.0%
to 34.9%) if all safety net benefits, both federal and state
alike, were suddenly eliminated (see Figure 5). In evaluating this result, one can at once be impressed with (a)
the size of the reduction (i.e., 12.9 points), and (b) the
percentage of the population that remains in poverty
even after the safety net does its work (i.e., 22.0%).
It’s the latter interpretation, however, that leads to the
view that a ramped-up safety net might deliver a rather
larger reduction in poverty. Because many families in
poverty are not using the programs available to them,
the state’s poverty rate could, at least in theory, be substantially reduced by more aggressively disseminating
information about programs, by making the enrollment
process as frictionless as possible, or by ensuring that
clients are in the optimizing constellation of programs.
It cannot be ruled out that a cost-effective approach
to addressing California’s high poverty rate is simply
to ensure that our existing programs are well and fully
used. The purpose of this final section is to examine the
likely returns to such an approach.
There is good reason to believe that take-up could be
improved for at least some California programs. Among
those eligible for CalFresh, only 53 percent receive
benefits, a participation rate that ranks California dead
last among the states.109 Although this rate is artificially

lowered in California because SSI recipients, who have
characteristically high participation, are ineligible for
CalFresh, it is still likely that take-up in California could
be increased substantially.110 As for the EITC, approximately 71 percent of eligible Californians receive the
credit, again a participation rate that is substantially
lower than that for the country as a whole.111 By contrast,
CalWORKs serves approximately 50 percent of children
in poverty, a rate that is higher than in most states.112
Even so, it is clear that CalWORKs is still underused,
especially by immigrants and single mothers.113 There
are of course many reasons why CalWORKs and other
programs are underused, including a misunderstanding of eligibility requirements, the belief that program
participation is stigmatizing or unnecessary, and the
difficulties and inconvenience of applying.114
It may be possible to overcome some of these problems
with a streamlined application process and improved
advertising and dissemination of information. Even for
scholars of poverty, the landscape of available programs and services in California is complicated, as is
the process of applying for them. For residents of California, there is an integrated online system for applying
to CalWORKs, CalFresh, and MediCal (which, depending on the county, is either CalWIN, C-IV, or LEADER), a
separate online system for applying for unemployment
insurance (EDD Online) and Disability Insurance (SDI
Online), a related online job center providing training and
job search assistance (and the associated America’s
Job Centers of California), an online portal for determining eligibility and enrolling in health care (CalHEERS), a
separate online system for applying for federal Social
Security benefits, a required in-person application for
Supplemental Security Income (including the California
supplement), a community-specific application process
for Head Start, and an online application process for the
California LIHEAP program. This is, by any standard, a
daunting landscape.
There are two ways forward when the program environment is so complicated. The first approach, that of
centralizing and streamlining the application process,
requires (a) solving the technical problem of building
high-quality websites and other application systems,
and (b) solving the administrative and legal problem of
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aligning policies across disparate programs.115 There
are currently no plans in California to effect cross-program aligning and streamlining of this sort (although
one of the online systems for applying to CalWORKs,
CalFresh, and MediCal is being updated). The second
approach, by contrast, takes the complicated landscape of programs for granted and focuses on helping
Californians negotiate it with the assistance of programming (e.g., home visiting) delivered under an equal
opportunity approach.
It follows that, insofar as an equal opportunity approach
is adopted, one should first understand its effects on
take-up before proceeding with any further reform.
If the take-up problem remains even after the plan is
implemented, then clearly an alternative or supplementary effort is required. The most promising way forward
in this case may be to take seriously the task of aligning programs and streamlining the application process.
This new process could be built—from the ground up—
on insights from behavioral economics that have been
demonstrated to increase take-up.
It is relevant in this regard that the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services has undertaken an extensive study of the returns to rebuilding the application
process in ways that exploit some of the key principles
of behavioral economics.116 That is, rather than assuming that clients will incorporate and dispassionately
weigh all available evidence, this approach recognizes
that the human capacity for attention, cognition, and
self-control is limited in ways that may interfere with
take-up. In one of their experimental projects, the
research team examined why incarcerated noncustodial
parents typically do not apply for a modification of their
child support orders, even though doing so would have
reduced their accumulated debt while incarcerated.
The team undertook a full redesign of the application
that entailed sending a teaser postcard notifying potential applicants for modification in advance of their first
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full-blown letter (“awareness raising”), using a short
checklist to simplify the application process (reduced
“cognitive load”), mentioning that other parents had
their child support orders reduced to as low as zero
(“social influence” effect), pre-populating the forms with
existing administrative data (reduced “hassle factor”),
and gently reminding those who failed to respond (“the
nudge”). These revisions, taken together, brought about
a large increase in take-up.
If the same principles were systematically applied to
each of California’s programs, the increased take-up
would likely reduce poverty substantially. The application process, now streamlined, could also be made
available via a smart phone application. As of 2013, 43
percent of those with household incomes of less than
$30,000/year mainly used their smart phone to access
the internet, a result likely driven by the relatively high
cost of maintaining other devices (e.g., laptops, tablets, desktop computers).117 It would also be possible to
deliver automated and personalized messages reminding clients of reapplications, informing them of work,
training, and school opportunities, and otherwise providing access to help and services. There is a growing
body of evidence showing that personalized reminders
of this sort, when crafted in accord with the best behavioral principles, can strongly influence behavior.118 This
new cadre of “automated caseworkers” could accordingly provide personalized cradle-to-grave service for
pennies on the dollar, release the human casework staff
from routine administrative tasks, and instead allow
them to devote their time to high-value activities.
It follows that the ongoing experimentation with such
behavioral principles should be carefully watched.
If take-up problems persist even after the the equal
opportunity plan is implemented, it may be in California’s interest to integrate these principles into its
application process.
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conclusions

W

e led off this report by noting that California’s
poverty rate, which now stands at 22.0 percent, is higher than that of any other state.
Worse yet, the poverty rate for high-school dropouts is
a shocking 53.9 percent, a rate over five times higher
than that for college graduates. The safety net has of
course stepped up to the challenge by reducing poverty
substantially relative to what would have prevailed in its
absence (see Figures 5 and 6). That said, even after the
safety net has done all its important work, we are left
with more than one in five Californians in poverty and
the highest poverty rate in the country.
Why hasn’t this dismal state of affairs led to the usual
task forces, the development of a new antipoverty
plan, and concerted action? There are, to be sure,
many reasons why poverty hasn’t been taken on, but
an especially important one is that we haven’t known
how to do so in a way that’s both backed by science
and consistent with our beliefs about how a safety net
should work. We therefore default to a business-asusual stance in which safety-net funding plods along,
the poverty research industry plods along, and there is
but a vague and distant hope that ultimately a magicbullet solution will present itself.
We do not need to wait any longer. The main purpose of
our report has been to display just how far the relevant
science has come and to craft an anti-poverty program
rooted in that science. Although the evidence is not
always clear-cut, there is a growing consensus around
a two-pronged approach that combines opportunityequalizing and wage-raising reform. This approach is
well-tested, yields returns in excess of the investments,
is consistent with our most fundamental commitments
about how labor markets should be set up, integrates
well with existing programming in California, and can
be delivered with a centralized or decentralized (e.g.,
Promise Neighborhood) approach.

The resulting program is not about treating symptoms,
not about providing short-term relief, and certainly not
about charity. It is about building a training system,
labor market, and economy that provide opportunities for everyone and that ensure decent rewards for
hard work. Because the proposed supply-side and taxcredit reforms treat the upstream causes of poverty,
they will bring about a permanent reduction in the size
of the poverty population and reduce future demands
on the safety net. The poverty population will permanently shrink because low-income children will have
new opportunities to develop capacities and make
high-payoff investments in skills. By virtue of these
opportunities, children from low-income families will no
longer be mired in the low-wage sector, which not only
raises their own wages but also reduces wage-lowering
competition among the shrinking number of children
who do remain in that sector.
The evidence behind this program is strong, but it is
not just evidence alone that recommends it. It is also
attractive because, unlike some safety net programs
and interventions, it comports well with the country’s
long-standing commitment to equalizing opportunity
and ensuring that hard work pays off. We too often
embrace the latest flavor-of-the-day programs simply
because they “work” and have supporters. This is surely
understandable: After all, only rarely does any povertyreducing program have much support, so we’re loathe
to be all that principled when one finally does. The great
virtue, however, of a more principled approach is that
it lays out our commitments clearly and allows us to
build our institutions in defense of them. The equalopportunity approach, for example, reminds us that
we’re committed to providing opportunities for all children and that we’ll intervene aggressively whenever
that commitment is circumvented. When our safety net
tells a simple story in this way, it becomes a cherished
institution that we hold near and dear, an institution that
makes sense to us and that we’re especially willing to
defend.
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